{"id":2827,"date":"2026-05-29T03:37:13","date_gmt":"2026-05-29T00:37:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/svaroglaw.com\/antymonopolne-zakonodavstvo-ukrayiny\/"},"modified":"2026-09-14T16:34:28","modified_gmt":"2026-09-14T13:34:28","slug":"antymonopolne-zakonodavstvo-ukrayiny","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/svaroglaw.com\/en\/antymonopolne-zakonodavstvo-ukrayiny\/","title":{"rendered":"Antitrust legislation in Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"

A fine from the Antimonopoly Committee can reach 10 % of a company\u2019s annual revenue for the previous reporting year<\/strong> (Art. 52 of the Law \u201cOn Protection of Economic Competition\u201d<\/span>) \u2014 and the base is revenue<\/strong>, not profit. Run it on your own figures: at revenue of 50 million UAH and a 4 % margin, annual profit is 2 million UAH while the maximum fine is 5 million \u2014 two and a half years of profit.<\/p>\n

10 %<\/b>of annual revenue \u2014 the maximum fine the committee can impose<\/span><\/div>\n

Another feature of the procedure: the committee investigates<\/strong>, decides<\/strong> and fines<\/strong> on its own. So a defence works above all during the investigation<\/strong>, while it is still possible to influence how the conduct is characterised and what evidence is gathered. Once a decision is made, two months remain to go to the commercial court (Art. 60 of the same Law).<\/p>\n

A competition lawyer is not only for disputes. More often the work comes earlier: agreeing a transaction, obtaining merger clearance, and not being fined for something that was always done \u201cthe usual way\u201d.<\/p>\n

<\/svg>+38 095 554-54-24<\/span><\/a>legal consultation<\/span><\/div>\n

What the committee fines for<\/h2>\n
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Anticompetitive concerted practices<\/h3>

The most serious category. Besides formal cartels it covers price fixing, market sharing and, most often, bid rigging<\/strong>. The classic scenario: two related companies bid for the same tender, one of them merely making up the numbers. The committee detects it through shared IP addresses, identical errors in documents and shared employees \u2014 and fines both.<\/p><\/div><\/article>

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Abuse of a dominant position<\/h3>

Imposing unfavourable terms, unjustified refusal to contract, discriminatory pricing.<\/p><\/div><\/article>

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Unfair competition<\/h3>

Copying the appearance of someone else\u2019s product, spreading misleading information, misappropriating another\u2019s reputation, comparative advertising in breach of the rules.<\/p><\/div><\/article>

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Concentration without clearance<\/h3>

A merger, or the acquisition of a company or a shareholding, requires prior clearance<\/strong> where the parties\u2019 figures exceed the thresholds in Art. 24. Implementing a concentration without clearance is itself an offence carrying a fine.<\/p><\/div><\/article>

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Failing to provide information, or providing false information<\/h3>

On the committee\u2019s request this is a separate offence, and the fine is imposed even where the main allegation is not made out.<\/p><\/div><\/article><\/div>\n

\"Ukrainian<\/a><\/p>\n

Bid rigging: why it is the most dangerous<\/h2>\n

This category accounts for the largest share of the committee\u2019s fining decisions and the heaviest consequences for a company.<\/p>\n

Besides the fine, Art. 17(1)(4) of the Law \u201cOn Public Procurement\u201d bites: a contracting authority rejects any bidder held liable, within the past three years<\/strong>, for anticompetitive concerted practices distorting tender results. For companies working with public contracts that effectively halts the business, which is why such decisions are fought to the end.<\/p>\n

<\/svg>The committee\u2019s evidence<\/span>

What the committee treats as evidence:<\/strong> shared IP addresses when bids were submitted, identical files and document metadata, consecutively numbered bank guarantees, shared employees, family ties between founders, identical errors in documents.<\/p><\/div><\/div>

<\/svg>Lines of defence<\/span>

What works<\/strong> both during the investigation and in court: showing there was no coordination (coincidence, a shared internet provider, the same consultant), economic justification of the pricing, incorrect characterisation of the conduct, procedural breaches during the investigation, and errors in calculating the fine, whose base is revenue for a particular year.<\/p><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n

Merger clearance<\/h2>\n

The application is filed before the agreement is signed: the committee has 45 days to consider it, or 25 under the simplified procedure, and that time has to be built into the deal timetable.<\/p>\n

The thresholds are set by Art. 24 of the Law \u201cOn Protection of Economic Competition\u201d. They are calculated for the last financial year, taking control relationships into account, in two alternative ways: by the combined worldwide assets and turnover of all parties together with a minimum Ukrainian figure for at least two of them, or by the target\u2019s Ukrainian figures combined with another party\u2019s turnover. The amounts are expressed in euro, so financial statements and the exchange rate on the date are needed. Implementing a concentration without clearance means a fine and the risk that the transaction is declared invalid.<\/p>\n

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